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Identity and Self-Knowledge
John Perry
Self, person, and identity are among the concepts most central to the way humans think
about themselves and others. It is often natural in biology to use such concepts; it seems
sensible to say, for example, that the job of the immune system is to attack the non-self, but
sometimes it attacks the self. But does it make sense to borrow these concepts? Don’t they
only pertain to persons, beings with sophisticated minds, and perhaps even souls? I argue
that if we focus on the every-day concepts of self and identity, and set aside loftier concepts
found in religion, philosophy, and psychology that are applicable, at most, to humans, we
can see that self and identity can be sensibly applied widely in biology.
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Editorial introduction: John Perry works primarily in logic, metaphysics and the philos-
ophy of mind—and this essay is a contribution to a sub-field in the latter: self-knowledge.
How do we have, and how do we understand, knowledge of ourselves and of our own men-
tal states? While initially this might seem quite far removed from the focus of this special
issue, there are two important reasons for including his piece here.
Firstly, the essay sets out and examines different uses of the term ‘self ’ and ‘identity’
(alongside the related notion of ‘genidentity’). Given the aims stated in the general intro-
duction, the utility of this should be clear; these terms are used in a variety of ways, and
Perry’s analysis provides a clear introduction, which helps us guard against confusions borne
from polyvalent expressions. (In doing this it stands alongside Christopher Shields’s piece,
‘What Organisms Once Were and Might Yet Be,’ which maps out the different nuances
of the ‘organism’ concept—and we hope such papers as these will invite philosophers of
biology (and biologists) to offer similar definitions of similar terms, e.g. ‘biological.’)
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Perry organises these definitions in relation to
discussions on going in the philosophy of biology (and biology more generally). Specifically,
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he focuses on how we might best interpret the so-called ‘self/no-self ’ model of immunology
(of the kind explored by Pradeu and Carosella), but his analysis of the notion of ‘self ’ is also,
of course, applicable to discussions of self-renewal (of the kind found in Melinda Fagan’s
examination of stem cell lineages—‘Stem Cell Lineages: Between Stem and Organism’—
also in this issue). In addition, Perry’s essay provides a useful partner piece to Rory Madden’s
‘Animal Self-Awareness.’ Both examine a characteristic question of the ‘personal identity’
debate: What am I? We are aware of ourselves, but our self-knowledge has limits—and the
character of the self to which we refer when we say ‘I’ is not immediately obvious. (Are
we purely psychological beings? Are we animals? Might we be both?) It is at this juncture
that Perry’s contribution begins to bleed into the focus of the special issue proper. It offers
insight into our ways of referring to things in the world while simultaneously emphasizing
how, as knowers, we are often and easily confused. In pursuing metaphysical inquiry, in
proposing ontologies of living beings, we must be aware of these pitfalls in order to avoid
them. –af/tp
The self/non-self model is no longer an appropriate explanation of experimental
data in immunology … this inadequacy may be rooted in an excessively strong
metaphysical conception of biological identity. We suggest that another hypothesis,
one based on the notion of continuity, gives a better account of immune phenomena.
Finally, we underscore the mapping between this metaphysical deflation from self
to continuity in immunology and the philosophical debate between substantialism
and empiricism about identity.
–Pradeu and Carosella (2006)
1 Introduction
The word ‘self ’ seems rather schizoid. It has a lofty use. In a philosophical or religious text, the
self may be taken to be the the deepest aspect of human existence: the mind, or the soul, or a
key aspect of both. In psychology, one’s self may be those properties and traits one or believes
oneself to have, that are most important and essential to who and what one is. Self-knowledge,
in either construal of the self, is important and perhaps hard to achieve. It’s not something
we expect of inanimate objects, like cars, or even living systems of a kind we humans like to
regard as more primitive than ourselves, like wisteria bushes, or magnetosomes, or chickens.
And whatever the right account of the immune system, it doesn’t seem that recognition of one’s
mind, or soul, as self rather than non-self could have much to do with it.
But the English morpheme ‘self ’ in its most common uses, seems to have a much more
modest job. It is not quite a word, but something that makes an ordinary pronoun into a reflexive
one: ‘her’ into ‘herself,’ ‘him’ into ‘himself,’ and ‘it’ into ‘itself.’ If I say my car is destroying itself,
because of the vibration caused by its unaligned wheels, I am not referring to some part or aspect
of the car, its self, that thinks and acts and might end up in heaven, nor to some aspects of my
car that my car finds very important. I am just referring to my car, as the thing being destroyed,
in a way that makes it clear that it is also the thing causing the destruction. If I say the wisteria
on my trellis is falling all over itself, I am just making it clear that the wisteria which falls and
the wisteria which it falls on are parts of the same plant.
When immunologists debate whether the job of the immune system is to protect self from
non-self, or talk about self-organizing systems, is it a lofty or a mundane sense of ‘self ’ that is
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being put to use? Or is it perhaps a misleading use of the word which imports, using ambiguity
veiled by unwitting metaphor, explanations and descriptions appropriate for humans into dis-
cussions of much different forms of life? I think it is rather an appreciation of more humble
uses of ‘self,’ which are applicable to all aspects of life, and central to understanding all of its
uses, even the most lofty.
In this essay I do not claim to solve, explain, or even understand, the various issues and
debates in biology in which the expression ‘self ’ may be used. I do hope to illuminate the
connection between the lofty and not so lofty uses of ‘self,’ and among various sorts of ‘self-
knowledge,’ in a way that might be relevant to such issues and helpful to those who discuss
them.
In particular, I consider two problems that have led philosophers to metaphysical worries
about selves, and complicated theories to assuage those worries: personal identity and self-
knowledge. I argue that their solution lies instead in the appreciation of the more humble,
and widely applicable, uses of ‘self ’ and ‘identity.’
2 Self, Identity, and Unity
Reflexive pronouns such as ‘itself,’ ‘himself,’ and ‘herself ’ are used when the object of an action
or attitude is the same as the subject of that action or attitude. If I say Mark Twain shot himself
in the foot, I describe Mark Twain not only as the shooter but as the person shot; if I say Mark
Twain admired himself, I describe him not only as the admirer but as the one admired. In this
sense, ‘the self ’ is just the person, or creature, or thing, that is both the subject and the object
of the attitude or action in question. Mark Twain, as subject, doubtless admired many people
over the years. Mark Twain, as object, continues to have many admirers. The pronoun ‘himself ’
allows us to get at the case where he is both subject and object of admiration. ‘Self ’ is also used
as a prefix for names of activities and attitudes, identifying the special case where the object is
the same as the agent: self-love, self-hatred, self-abuse, self-promotion, self-knowledge, and
suicide.
When we say ‘the same’ and ‘identity’ in these contexts, we mean that there is only one thing.
The way I shall I use ‘A and B are identical,’ it means there is just one thing that both is A
and is B. Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens are identical because there is just one fellow that
was Mark Twain and was Samuel Clemens; one fellow, two names. Both words, ‘identity’ and
‘same,’ are also used for various forms of similarity. When we say that twins are identical, we
do not mean that there is just one of them. If you are washing your car, and I say, ‘I’m going
to do the same thing,’ I probably mean I am going to wash my car, not that I am going to help
you wash yours. I’m going to do something similar to what you are doing, but there will be two
similar car-washings, not just one.
Some philosophers, notably Heraclitus around 500 BCE, argued that that similarity is the
most we can find in the world; identity rules out change, but change is everywhere, so identity is
nowhere. ‘You cannot step in the same river twice, because new waters are rushing in’ (Heraclitus
2003). Heraclitus held a view that now might be termed ‘process philosophy.’ The world consists
of events, happening one after the other; change and flux are the rule; permanent objects are
illusory; explanation always rests on relations among events, not on the dubious category of
things.
Modern process philosophers, like Whitehead, agree about the importance of events and the
ubiquity of change, but do not see permanent or semi-permanent objects as illusions (White-
head 1929). Such things are real processes made up of events that bear important relations,
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especially causal relations, to one another. Our concepts of things are based on these relations
and their importance; such processes exhibit significant patterns we can recognize and use to
cope with the changing world.
I think one can step in the same river twice, even though not only the river stepped into, but
also the person doing the stepping, consist of events and exhibit continual change.
But how can the same river contain, and even consist in, different water at different times?
A Heracliean might appeal to the self-evident principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. If A
and B are identical —that is, that there is just one thing that is both A and B—then if A has a
certain property, B has it too. After all, if there is just one thing that is both A and B, that one
thing can’t both have and not have a given property. Doesn’t it follow that if the river I stepped
in yesterday is the identical river I step in today, and the river I stepped in yesterday contained,
say, water molecule 73, then the river I step in today must also contain water molecule 73? Such
arguments have led philosophers to think that if persons are to have real identity, there must be
unchanging substances or essences involved.
But the argument is no good. Objects have properties at times. An object cannot both have
and lack a property at a given time. But an object can have a property at one time, and lack that
same property at another time. The river I step in today contained water molecule 73 yesterday,
even though it doesn’t contain it today. And the river I stepped into yesterday does not contain
water molecule 73 today, even though it contained it yesterday. There is just one river. And
similarly, there was just one person, one self, namely me, who stepped in the river yesterday and
did so again today. Our concepts of objects and their properties allow an object to change, in
the sense of having different properties at different times; this does not conflict with any sound
principle of logic or metaphysics.
That does not mean there are no constraints on how an object can change. You can’t step in
the same river twice by stepping into a North American River Monday and and African river
Wednesday. Rivers can change a lot in two days, but not by being in one continent on Monday,
and on another continent, separated from the first by an ocean, on Wednesday. And something
that is a river on Wednesday will not change into a building, or a human being, or number no
matter how long we wait. Where do these constraints come from?
Identity, I said, means that there is just one object. That seems simple enough, but can be
puzzling. Is it a relation at all? After all, if it is true that A is identical with B, then there is just
one thing that is bothA andB. But don’t we have to have at least two objects to have a relation?
If we grant that identity is a relation, it seems to be quite universal and trivial: every object is
identical to itself and no other. Any number is identical to itself. Any mountain is identical to
itself. Any photon is identical to itself. And every person is identical to himself or herself. But
deciding issues involved in identity can be a tricky process. Is there really a single trivial relation
involved in all of these diverse phenomena?
We need to distinguish between identity and what I will call ‘temporal and spatial unity
relations.’ These unity relations vary with the kind of objects we are considering, and they are
where constraints arise. Imagine a simple kitchen table. The table I am imagining has five spatial
parts—four legs and a top. These parts are not identical with one another. They are related to
one another in various other ways. Any two parts are either attached to another, either directly
or indirectly, in such a way as to form a composite object with a certain shape and size, which
can fulfill a certain function: it’s tall enough for chairs to slip under it, and flat enough and large
enough to put plates and glasses on without their slipping off. The ways the parts need to be
related at a given time, so that they form a whole with a characteristic shape, size, and function
we call a ‘table,’ constitute the spatial unity relation for tables, at least for simple tables like I am
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imagining.
Although the five parts are not identical, there is just one table of which they are all parts.
If I say, pointing in turn to different legs, ‘the table of which this is a part, is identical with the
table of which that is a part,’ I make a true identity statement. At the level of the parts, we have
real relations: being attached; being formed from the same kind of wood, etc. But there is just
one table, which shares all of its properties with itself, as demanded by the indiscernibility of
identicals.
There is also a temporal unity relation for tables.1 Given our process ontology, this is a
relation between events. Consider two events, on successive days, each consisting of a kitchen
table occupying a room. If there is just one table, we expect these events to be parts of a spatio-
temporally continuous path of such events. At every spatio-temporal point along such a path,
there is a table occupying the space at the time, and the successive tables are either very similar,
or there is an explanation for the changes—if, say, someone paints the table.
There is an ancient problem about identity, that brings out the importance of the distinction
between identity and unity.
The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, and
was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus,
for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger
timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among
the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding
that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same
(Plutarch).
In daily life, when we disassemble objects and then reassemble them, we have no problem con-
sidering them identical. If the repair shop takes my bicycle completely apart and cleans and
reassembles the parts, it’s still my bike, the same one I brought in for repair. Even if they re-
place a few parts, there is no question. It seems that there is a sort of default unity relation
for bicycles and other such artifacts. They should be spatially temporally continuous, with their
parts intact at each point. But we have some back up relations which take care of identity in the
strange cases that can arise with things that can be taken apart and put back together.
In the case of the Ship of Theseus, as Plutarch describes it, the worry is how many parts
can the Athenians replace, and still have the same ship? None? Half? All? Perhaps there is no
clear answer? And then there is an added worry. What if Athena carefully saved all the planks
that were removed and replaced, and then reassembled them into a ship just like the original.
Wouldn’t her ship, with the original planks, really be the original, rather the version honored by
Athenians, with all its new planks?
Problems like this have led some philosophers to recommend giving up the concept of iden-
tity through time, in place of genidentity, a relation between temporal parts. Of course, the
temporal parts, if they last any time at all, still have identity, so identity won’t go a way com-
pletely.
At issue is the transitivity and symmetry of identity. If A is identical with B, and B is
identical with C, then A is identical with C. If A is identical with B, B is identical with A.
These properties follow from the fact that we just have one thing all along. Now each part of a
1The concept of a temporal unity similar to that of genidentity, an idea developed by Kurt Lewin in
his Habilitationsschrift (Lewin 1922), and used by Reichenbach, Carnap, and others in the philosophy
of science. This concept is usually connected with the idea of replacing identity with genidentity for
scientific purposes, in part because of problems like the Ship of Theseus, discussed below.
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thing, temporal or spatial, provides a way of referring to the thing of which it is a part: ‘the ship
of which this plank is a part’ or ‘the baseball game of which this is an inning.’ It seems to follow
that the unity relations should also be transitive and symmetrical, so that they are equivalence
relations (reflexive, transitive, and symmetrical). And usually they are. All the innings played
this summer will doubtless fall neatly into games, for example.
But unity relations, unlike identity, are not always necessarily equivalence relations. High-
ways are a good example. Highway 1 goes up the Coast of California. Highway 101 stays
inland, sometimes a few miles east of Highway 1, sometimes many miles. They merge to cross
the Golden Gate Bridge. If the unity relation just requires a path from one highway part to
another, then all the parts of both highway will have it to one another, and we won’t have two
highways after all, just one, with different names for different parts. This might lead us to posit
a more complex relation for highway temporal unity. A and B are parts of the same highway if
you can get from one to the other without leaving the road or making a U-turn, perhaps. So we
have two highways, that share a part. Then when I am on the Bridge, am I on two highways?
It doesn’t seem like it.
Does it matter much which we of looking at it we choose? Perhaps, because Highway 1 is
a state highway, while Highway 101 is a Federal highway. The state of California might argue
that the first option is right, there is just one highway, and the Federal government should pay
for everything. Legal issues aside, it doesn’t seem like a deep problem.
Seeing genidentity as a replacement for identity is motivated by the idea that such indeter-
minate and puzzling cases cannot be tolerated in science, particularly axiomatic science. But in
every day life with every day objects, it’s seldom a problem. We all understand, at least implic-
itly, how the identity of objects rests on unity relations. When the concept of identity doesn’t
quite fit certain cases, we revert to thinking in terms of parts and unity relations.
In the case of persons, it is easy to come up with possible cases in which plausible temporal
unity relations for persons turn out not to be equivalence relations (Perry 1972). These possi-
bilities are crises for those who place personal identity in an immutable essence or immaterial
soul (see below). On my view, they work to remind us that even with persons, the concept of
identity is applicable because the underlying relations of unity are well-behaved. Perhaps, with
the march of science, they will become less so.
3 Personal Identity
Tables and human beings are both physical things, systems of physical events, related to one
another through space and time. But of course humans have many properties that tables don’t.
We are complex biological systems. We have sentience and intentionality. That is, we perceive
and feel, and we have beliefs and desires.
Descartes argued that no physical system can have such properties as sentience and inten-
tionality (Descartes [1641] 1993). We need to see minds as a separate sort of things from
physical bodies. These non-physical minds, Descartes thought, were immaterial substances,
which could be identified with the souls needed by Christian theology. My mind/soul/self can
survive, when my body and all of its parts have turned to dust and ashes. Minds are not made
out of dust and ashes in the first place, so they don’t need to return to dust and ashes when we
die. A and B are the same person, if they have the same mind.
While no philosophical views, as far as I can tell, are ever completely abandoned, ‘Cartesian
dualism’ is not very common these days. However, what is called ‘property dualism’ is advocated
by many, who provide interesting arguments for it. The idea is that such things as being in pain,
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or seeing a sunset, or believing that Albany is the capital of New York—properties involved in
sentience and intentionality—are properties a human has in virtue of the states and properties
of his brain or central nervous system. But they are not physical properties of the brain. I won’t
worry much about property dualism. For one thing, I’ve already done the best I can to refute
the arguments for it (Perry 2001). For another, the issue is somewhat orthogonal to the main
items I wish to discuss.
What is the temporal unity relation for persons? John Locke argued that even if there
are immaterial substances of the sort Descartes postulated, they won’t serve to define personal
identity, as we have no way of knowing, and no reason for caring, whether or not the same
immaterial substance ‘thinks in us’ from time to time, immaterial substances being immaterial,
invisible, and pretty much wholly mysterious (Locke 1690). The view he advocated fits much
better with the process perspective and the points I have been making. In my terminology,
he thought that the temporal unity relation for persons was memory—in particular memories
of past thoughts and actions. Memory gives us a relation between a current experience—the
remembering—and a past experience, thinking something or doing something. The person who
does the remembering is the identical person who did the action, or thought the thought.
Locke’s theory has been modified, improved, and defended in many ways in the face of
many objections (see Perry 2008). For my purposes, the key point is that it gives us an account
of personal identity that does not require the postulation of immaterial substances, interactions
between material and immaterial worlds, and other mysteries. In a moment I will argue that it
fits into what one might think of as a very biological picture of the self.
4 The Self as Subject and Object
One motivation for somewhat metaphysical, and somewhat mysterious, accounts of the self is
‘the problem of the self as subject.’ Suppose I think that I live in Palo Alto. I play two roles in
this episode of thought. I am the subject; that is the agent who thinks the thought. And I am
the object, the thing the thought is about. For various reasons, philosophers have found the self
as subject mystifying. When he looked around, Wittgenstein thought he could find himself
as object—he could see his legs, for example. But he couldn’t find himself as subject: ‘The
thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing’ (Wittgenstein 1922). Tom Nagel draws a
conclusion at least as surprising, that the thinking self is outside of space and time, but sees the
world through the perspective of a particular human body (Nagel 1983).
We cannot solve the problem of the self as subject by participating in the lofty and meta-
physical discourse about the self. The solution lies in the humbler uses of ‘self.’
I distinguish three kinds of knowing (and not knowing) things about oneself, which I call
primitive self-knowledge, self-knowledge, and knowledge of the person one happens to be. I claim all
organisms have primitive self-knowledge, and it is the basis of self-knowledge.
I begin with an example I’ve used elsewhere; apologies to anyone who has already encoun-
tered it. One day in Vienna, Ernst Mach boarded a bus through the rear door. Looking towards
the front, he noticed a rather shabbily dressed, bookish sort of fellow. ‘What a shabby peda-
gogue is that,’ he thought to himself. He didn’t realize he was seeing his own reflection in a
mirror of the sort conductors use to keep track of things when buses are crowded (Mach 1914,
4n).
Assuming his verdict was accurate, at this point Mach had what I call ‘knowledge of the
person he happened to be.’ There is a certain person, the one he saw in the mirror, whom he
knew to be a shabby pedagogue. And, unknown to him, that person happened to be Mach
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Figure 1: A mousetrap.
himself.
We wouldn’t ordinarily call this self-knowledge, any more than we call accidentally killing
oneself suicide. Still, killing oneself is a necessary part of suicide, and knowing a fact about the
person you happen to be is a necessary part of self-knowledge. Assuming that, up until this
time, Mach didn’t think of himself as a shabby pedagogue, it was more a case of self-ignorance.
Mach didn’t believe that he was a shabby pedagogue, because he didn’t believe that he was the
person he was looking at. The italicized ‘he’ warns us that we have a certain way of believing
things about oneself in mind: the sort of case where a person would use the word ‘I’ to express
the belief.
After a bit, Mach realized what was going on, that he was seeing himself in the mirror. Then
he thought to himself, ‘I am a shabby pedagogue!’ This is what I call self-knowledge.
So what happened when Mach went from simply knowing, about a certain person who hap-
pened to be him, that that person was a shabby pedagogue, to having what we would ordinarily
call self-knowledge, that is, knowing that he was a shabby pedagogue—having the sort of knowl-
edge he would express with the first person: ‘I am a shabby pedagogue’? The sort of knowledge
that has Mach as both subject and object?
The difference, I want to claim, is that Mach incorporates the knowledge that a certain
person is a shabby pedagogue into the file of things that he knows about himself primitively. To
explain this, I need to introduce the concept of harnessing information. And to do that, I am
going to consider an artifact: an ordinary mousetrap. A rather macabre example, I fear; perhaps
a case where death helps us appreciate life.
I’ll remind you how mousetraps like this one work. One puts some cheese on the catch. A
hold-down bar attached to the back of the platform is placed over the hammer and then secured
under the catch. When a mouse nibbles on the cheese, the catch moves, the bar is released, the
hammer is freed, and due to the spring, smashes down on the front of the trap, killing the
mouse.
Here is a way of looking at this as harnessing information. First, information. Consider
an event, x’s being  at t. This may carry the information that another event, say y’s being  
at t0 has occurred, is occurring, or will occur. That is, given the way the world works, at least
for a time in a region—the constraints—and the particular circumstances in the t–t0 interval,
an event of the first type significantly increases the probability of an event of the second type.
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What counts as ‘significant’ depends on what we are talking about.
With the mousetrap, the constraints involve the strength of springs, the nature of mouse
bodies, the width of the wire of which the hammer is made, the behavior of mice, as well
as such things as size of cats and human feet. In the case of mousetraps the user chooses the
circumstances, and so, to a certain extent, the constraints. Suppose I place the trap in the narrow
space between my refrigerator and the wall. I place it back far enough that my toe won’t hit the
catch when I get something from the refrigerator. The space is narrow enough that the cat can’t
get in far enough to stretch a paw the cheese. Given the way mice work, and these circumstances
and others, the catch moving will often carry the information that there is a mouse at the front
end of the trap.
How much does the catch moving have to increase the probability of there being a mouse
in a position to be killed, in order to count as ‘significant’? Not much; for ordinary mouse traps
the cost of false positives is not very high. If the traps were expensive, and could only be used
once, that would change things.
Now consider the purpose of the trap. I am using it to catch and kill mice. That’s what’s
supposed to happen when the hammer is released. We can distinguish between purpose and
the conditions of success. The hammer smashing down on the front of the trap will succeed in
its purpose only under certain conditions, namely, if there is a mouse situated there.
So the movement of the catch, by carrying the information that there is a mouse at the
catch, carries the information (more or less) that the conditions of success for the snapping of
the hammer are satisfied. The architecture of the trap harnesses this information. The size of
platform, the shape and size of the hammer, the force of the spring, and the length of the hold-
down bar ensure (more or less) that the hammer will be released when and only when there is
a mouse in a position to be killed. Or at least, these factors make it reasonably probable that if
there is a mouse there the hammer will be released, and if the hammer is released it is reasonably
probable that there is a mouse there.
I don’t want to say that the mousetrap has primitive self-knowledge. Primitive self-knowl-
edge is what we get when Nature harnesses information; that is, when the processes of evolution
result in a system that (a) has a repertoire of actions that can promote a natural value, such as sur-
vival or reproduction, and (b) has the capacity to pick up information about the circumstances
of success of this action, and (c) has an architecture that harnesses that information.
Values require a valuer, it seems. For these cases, we invent one: Mother Nature. But
that’s a metaphor. And so is my phrase ‘natural value.’ To think of naturally evolving systems
as harnessing information, we need to find four things: information that is detected, actions
that are caused, an architecture connecting these, and an ‘end-state’ that is promoted by this
arrangement. It’s nice to think of these end-states chosen by Mother Nature, in accordance
with her values, although if we pursue the metaphor too far, Mother Nature will turn out to be
rather an odd duck.
A simple example of such natural harnessing is the magnetosome (Dretske 1986). Built-in
magnets detect which direction is magnetic north; the architecture of a magnetosome deter-
mines that it swims in that direction. In the northern hemisphere, such swimming takes the
magnetosome into deeper water, where there is less oxygen, which is the situation the magne-
tosome needs to survive.
Or consider a chicken, looking at a kernel of grain in the barnyard. The state of the chicken’s
eyes carry a lot of information, in the sense that the eyes wouldn’t be in that state, or at least it
would be very improbable that they would be, unless certain other things are true. Their being
in that state may carry the information that life has evolved, that there is a sun, an so on. But,
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following Dretske (1986), what the chicken perceives is that information that is harnessed by the
chicken’s architecture.
The chicken perceives the presence of an edible kernel. This is the information carried by
the state of its eyes that is harnessed. In a well-run barnyard, at least, where there won’t be any
kernels toxic to chickens lying around, the chicken’s eyes wouldn’t be in that state unless there
were something nourishing in front of it, waiting to be pecked. If the chicken is hungry, which
in my experience chickens almost always are, being in this state will lead it in a way that leads
to digestion of the nutritious corn or millet. The architecture of chickens harnesses information
for the end of survival of the chicken in question.
The chicken has what I call primitive self-knowledge. The information that the chicken
detects is information about itself —using self in a perfectly modest way, and not as a hidden
metaphor for selves or souls or complex minds of the sorts that humans have that allow them
to admire themselves, hate themselves, and have identity crises. It is information about the the
direction and distance of the kernel of corn from the very chicken who sees it that is harnessed.
And it is harnessed for the benefit of that very chicken—it is the one which gets nourished
as a result of pecking in that situation. So the chicken does have information about itself. It
has primitive self-knowledge. This does not require mastery of the first-person, or some special
inner version of ‘I.’ It just requires an architecture that allows pick up of information about
the chicken, and harnesses that information to cause actions by that chicken, that promote the
relevant values.
When the chicken perceives a kernel of corn, it perceives things concerning itself: that there
is a kernel of corn a certain distance and direction from it. Any chicken could be in the same
state, but by being in that state, each chicken has information about itself. I call such states
normally self-informative.
Similarly, when the chicken pecks at the kernel of corn in front of it, the effects of the
pecking, if conditions for success are present, are effects on that same chicken: it ingests a
kernel of corn and it gets nourished. This is a normally self-effecting way of acting.
Chickens are among the animals that do not pass the ‘mirror test.’ A chicken looking at a
mirror is perceiving itself. But it is not doing it in a normally self-informative way, but rather via
states that would normally be caused by seeing other chickens which were in close in front of it,
and looking right at it. And it acts accordingly, with aggressive behavior. Great apes, including
chimpanzees and humans, pass the mirror test (Gallup 1970). If you put a chimpanzee in a
room with a full length mirror, it will initially exhibit some aggression, like the chicken. But
with a little time, other behaviors emerge. In particular, if you anesthetize the chimpanzee, put
some colored stuff above its eyebrow and behind its ear, when it awakes, and sees its reflection, it
will engage in normally self-effecting action, using its own arms to rub the smudges, a technique
that wouldn’t work to clean up other chimps.
What a chimpanzee can do, and a chickens can’t, is to integrate information about itself
obtained in ways that are not normally self-informative—information about the chimpanzee it
happens to be—with information obtained in self-informative ways. Thus information of the
former kind motivates normally self-effecting actions, as in the case of the smudged chimpanzee.
Now let us return to Mach. Mach doesn’t pass the mirror test at the beginning of the episode.
Suppose the shabbiness in question includes having a lot of lint on one’s vest. When Mach
sees lint on his own vest by looking downwards at the front of his clothed body, he will more-
or-less automatically swipe it off with his hand. Normally self-informative way of perceiving
lint-on-one’s-vest, normally self-effecting way of removing it. At the beginning of the episode,
Mach picks up information about the lint on Mach’s vest, in a way that is not normally self-
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informative. But his information is not integrated with his self-knowledge. He does not say ‘I
have lint on my vest,’ a normally self-referring way of speaking. And he does not wipe the lint
of his vest with a normally self-effecting swipe of the hand.
But then, in a bit, he does pass the test. Like most of us, Mach had a pretty good idea of
what he looks like to others, so perhaps he first recognized himself, and then figured out that
he must be looking in a mirror. Or perhaps he noted an agreement between the movements he
initiated and the ones the fellow he saw made. Or perhaps he just remembered that busses have
such mirrors, and went from there. In any case, he integrates the information he perceived about
the man in the mirror with the information he has about himself via normally self-informative
ways, and acts accordingly. The difference between merely having knowledge about the person
one happens to be, and having self-knowledge, is primitive self-knowledge. To recognize that
the person one has learned about is oneself, the person we each call ‘I,’ and normally worry about
in a rather special way, is simply to integrate the information gained on this occasion with the
information gained in normally self-informative ways.
5 Conclusion
Understanding the cluster of philosophical problems around persons and personal identity,
selves and self-knowledge, depends on eschewing the metaphysical constructions, and seeing
the concepts as reflecting very basic structures and processes, of biological phenomena. There
is no doubt that biology can be helpful to philosophy. The naturalness of using such concepts
as ‘self ’ and ‘non-self ’ in biology suggests that clarity on these matters might be helpful, so
philosophy can return the favor.
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